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the factors of social mobility and the relative dispersion of economic and
political power. Both analyses proceed within the limits of great adulation
for certain political leaders. It is difficult indeed to find in Schlesinger any
mention or implication of shortcoming in Franklin Roosevelt; it is hardly more
difficult (though less to be expected) to find any criticism of Marx, Lenin,
or Stalin.
Both books, as political platforms, are propaganda. Foster's is far more
so than Schlesinger's, by common tests: Foster ignores or slides over much
more of the truth. Much of what Foster says depends for plausibility on the
circumstance that Russia is not easily observable by his readers. Schlesinger,
on the other hand, must run a far stiffer course in that the sources of American history and life are as open to his readers as they are to him.
Foster is worth reading as a lesson in Communist propaganda. Schlesinger is worth reading as a provocative analysis and program of choice in
American politics.
CHARLES A. H.

THOMSONt

SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS-CRIMINAL GUILT, New York

University School of Law, 1950. Pp. ii, 93. $1.50.
Under the guidance of Professor Edmond N. Cahn, New York University's very able legal philosopher, annual conferences on the social meaning
of legal concepts were initiated two years ago. The subject of the first
conference was the inheritance of property. In his Introduction to the published report of that conference, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, a former president
of the American Bar Association and now Chief Justice of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, explains the purpose of the project:
Progress in the law is manifestly dependent upon our utilization
of all the available knowledge of man and of society.
The annual conference on

SOCIAL MEANING OF

LEGAL

CONCEPTS

is a scholarly effort, not merely to pose the fundamental educational
problem of the relation of the law to the social sciences but, by focusing attention upon a particular legal institution, to come forth with
specific findings and recommendations from the several social
sciences which will have concrete significance for the single fundamental legal concept chosen for discussion.
The monograph here reviewed contains essays by a law professor, an
anthropologist, a criminologist, a psychiatrist, and a professor of theology,
with remarks by a judge, several lawyers, and a sociologist. The purpose
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was to explore the meaning of the concept of guilt from the viewpoint of
the several disciplines indicated above.
The importance of studying such problems can hardly be exaggerated.
To the reasons advanced by Judge Vanderbilt may be added the needs and
obligations of the Bar and the consequent duty of the law schools to meet
the insistent challenge of changing problems, new kinds 'of practice, and the
growth of knowledge in many fields. To phrase this challenge in terms of
the interrelations of law and empirical knowledge may suggest a sort of
academic other-worldliness. But that is far from the actual situation, as may
be inferred from a mere pointing to the careers of such men as Holmes,
Cardozo, Root, Hughes, Darrow, Vanderbilt, Hand, and many other leaders
of the Bench and Bar. The plain fact is that a knowledge of jurisprudence and
the social disciplines increases legal knowledge and opens avenues of resourcefulness which otherwise remain terra incognita. This has become rather evident in labor law and criminal law where a knowledge of industrial relations, in
the former, and of psychiatry in the latter is a prerequisite to a lawyer's effectiveness. So, too, of corporate finance, the economics of taxation, and
numerous other fields.
The lawyer's problems require the application of such knowledge to legal
issues; and they are not easily solved, as appears from an examination of the
present monograph. For, although it is both interesting and instructive, it fell
short of possible accomplishment because the participants in the conference
were not clear and definite about their objectives. The problem before them
was not carefully formulated. The theory of inter-disciplinary analysis was
not considered. Not even the approximate length of the various essays was
controlled. The final results are therefore disappointing, although the mere
bringing together of the contributions made from different viewpoints is
significant.
It is impossible here to discuss any of the essays in detail, but a very interesting phase of the conference may be noted. Mr. Edwin J. Lukas, who is a
lawyer and the Executive Director of the Society for the Prevention of
Crime, presents a very long essay in which he is extremely critical of the
criminal law; and his principal thesis is that criminals are sick people who
suffer from various psychoses which punishment only aggravates. His
deterministic stand is refut*ed by a later contributor; but what is particularly
interesting is the contribution of Dr. Frederic Wertham, a distinguished psychiatrist who is a director of two clinics and chief of staff of the psychiatric
service of a large hospital. From wide experience he finds that only a relatively small percentage of criminals suffer from psychiatric disorders. "The
claim of the crime-is-a-disease school, that every criminal has an emotional
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disorder, is not correct in any strict scientific sense."' Dr. Wertham also
dissents from the opinion that the criminal law bars or handicaps adequate
introduction and use of psychiatric knowledge in criminal trials. He states,'
"This claim, according to my studies, is entirely unfounded . . . The law not
only makes possible but, as I see it, demands the scientific diagnosis of a
mental disease from the psychiatric expert." 2
This reviewer would be among the last to assert that the criminal law
cannot be considerably improved; e.g., to mention only one instance, far too
little use is made of available knowledge regarding alcoholism, where intoxication is involved in criminal liability. But the wholesale assaults on law by
many psychiatrists and criminologists, who would have us abandon legal controls and place life and liberty in their hands, are more than questionable;
and it is comforting to learn that necessary correction is being made by
psychiatrists and social scientists of undoubted competence. The correct
inference is not that the social disciplines are worthless for legal purposes.
It is that they are no substitute for sound law and adjudication and that the
lawyer's job is to understand them sufficiently to be able to use them without
sacrificing legal safeguards.
A final point made by Dr. Wertham is important in about ten
states,
including Indiana, where the "irresistible impulse" test is apparently recognized. "In my opinion," he writes, "the criminal law which makes use of the
conception of irresistible impulse is not an advance belonging to the present
'scientific social' era. It is a throwback to, or rather a survival of, the previous
'philosophical psychological' era. The concept of irresistible impulse derives
from a philosophical, speculative, synthetic psychology. It forms no part of
and finds no support in the modern dynamic psychoanalytic study of mental
processes."
Regardless of the inadequacy of certain contributions to this symposium
on the social meaning of legal concepts, these efforts to advance legal knowledge deserve encouragement. As experience grows and methods improve,
the conferences should provide specific illustrations of their practical value.
JEROME HALLf
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